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ABSTRACT
Vaccine hesitancy, resulting from bad information, threatens the possibility of ending the
COVID-19 pandemic through mass vaccination. The COVID-19 pandemic coincides with an
overabundance of controversial information regarding disease transmission and public health
mitigation approaches. We investigate a phenomenological co-evolution of pandemic and
infodemic in the context of COVID-19 with an emphasis on evolutionary game theory. Using
bifurcation analysis, we determine the limit cycle boundaries and the separation of attraction
between stable foci of infection and periodic outbreaks of infection. Our results suggest that low
risk perception of vaccination relative to infection is not sufficient to eradicate the disease;
promotion of quarantine methods or targeted mitigation of the spread of corona-misinformation
is necessary to drive the system to disease free equilibrium.

INDEX WORDS: Infodemic, Pandemic, Vaccination, COVID-19, Model, Co-Evolution, Game
Theory

Copyright by
Anthony J Morciglio
2021

A Co-Evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic

by

Anthony J Morciglio

Committee Chair:

Committee:

Yi Jiang

Alexandra Smirnova
Igor Belykh

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
December 2021

iv
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of innocent souls lost and acknowledgement of
irreparable damages from the COVID-19 pandemic. I honor their interrupted lives, unrealized
potentials, and undiscovered purposes taken from our world. I also honor the selfless love and
unrelenting dedication from front-line workers that risk physical and mental health each day to
care for those in our society struggling with this virus and its lingering effects. I dedicate my
work for their testament of perseverance in the face of unabating challenge to cope and live in
our world crippled and forever changed in many ways by this virus.
Anthony honor's all his family, friends, and colleagues supporting him in this long and
enduring journey. I appreciate all those that have helped and guided me to the journey of
achieving my degree.

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Anthony would like to thank his advisors for their guidance and sponsorship. It was a
significant help in this complex process of organization, discovery, and encouragement with the
pressures of obtaining a master’s degree in mathematics. I would like to thank his PI, Yi, for her
patience and ability to teach me to see that research focuses on the bigger picture. Anthony
would like to thank Alexandria for her teaching and team competition in Vector Calculus and
Optimization courses. Anthony would like to thank Igor for his teaching in the Advanced
Mathematical Biology course. Anthony would like to thank the faculty and staff at the
prestigious Georgia State University for their continued support and leadership.
This work was partially supported a 2CI PhD Fellowship from Georgia State University
(to AM). Thank those who helped you through this research. Anthony would like to thank his
advisor: Dr. Yi Jiang, Georgia State University, all previous instructors in his undergraduate and
graduate program, and colleagues at the lab.
Lastly, I would like to thank my high school instructors: Dr. Vermilya, Mrs. Lucking, and
Mr. Grummer. If it were not for their interest in my future education and determination to
convince me to explore my interests and ask questions, I would not have obtained a degree in
Mathematics. Nor would I have transitioned from the suburban community of Woodstock, GA to
the large urban city in Atlanta, Georgia, and never would I have thought of pursuing a master’s
degree in Mathematics with the dream of learning Mathematics. I thank them, my parents, and
close relatives for building confidence in my abilities, challenging my foundation, and pushing
me to my intellectual limits.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ V
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. XIV
1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
1.1

2

Background................................................................................................................... 4
RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 8

2.1

A Mathematical Model for the Coevolution of Epidemic and Infodemic ............... 8

2.2

Model Formulation .................................................................................................... 13

2.2.1

Model ...................................................................................................................... 13

2.2.2

Nullclines ................................................................................................................ 14

2.2.3

Perturbation about Steady States ........................................................................... 15

2.2.4

Calculation of the Jacobian ................................................................................... 16

2.3

Game Theoretical Formulation of Vaccination ....................................................... 17

2.3.1

Deriving the Risk Function .................................................................................... 17

2.3.2

Computing the Nash Equilibrium ......................................................................... 18

2.4

Local Sensitivity Analyses ......................................................................................... 19

2.5

Rich Dynamical Patterns for Coevolution of Pandemic and Infodemic ............... 20

2.6

Infodemic Drives Pandemic: Stopping Infodemic is necessary to stop Epidemic 21

vii
2.7

High Risk Perception of Infection Promotes Vaccination ...................................... 24

2.8

High Vaccination Efficacy Impedes Infection ......................................................... 27

2.9

Education Reduces Infection ..................................................................................... 28

3

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 31
3.1

Future Directions ....................................................................................................... 33

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 35

viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1.1 Model parameters and their baseline values. All parameters are unitless, except for γ
with unit 1/ day. Note that: γ, χ, χ ̂ and m are kept constant in the simulations reported
below. ................................................................................................................................ 11
Table 2.3.1 Marginal expectation difference ∆E in equation 2.1.6 with respect to risk perception
of vaccination relative to infection, r, fraction of vaccinated V, and fraction of infected I.
The parameter range for the incentive to vaccinate is greater at higher levels of infection
as compared to vaccination. .............................................................................................. 18

ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1.1 Schematic representation of co-evolution of infodemic and pandemic. The
susceptible population with good information, SG, is infected with corona-misinformation
and virus at transmission probabilities: µ and χ respectively. The susceptible with bad
information SB have an increased force of infection χ < 𝜒. Once a susceptible becomes
infected, they recover at rate γ. Additionally, the misinformed infectious IB become
educated at rate ϵ. The probability that a susceptible person with good information, SG,
becomes vaccinated with probability φ. The vaccination compartment acts as a leakage
and become re-infected. ...................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2.5.1: Three simple dynamics emerge from the co-evolution model. The three columns
represent the time evolution of state variables, effective reproductive number, and phase
portraits respectively. A, D, G: The system undergoes mixed oscillations of low
amplitude low frequency of infection. B, E, H: The system exhibits stable focus of high
infection and infection. C, F, I: The system undergoes a stable periodic oscillation of low
infection (here µ = 0.24). Initial conditions about the steady states in Figures 2.7.1, 2.7.2
using the algorithm in section 2.2.3. ................................................................................. 21
Figure 2.6.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed
points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node
with an identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf
bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a

x
perturbation of the branching point bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. At high r the
system displays mixed oscillations and decreasing µ drives the system to DFE. ............ 22
Figure 2.6.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed
points respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an
identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a
pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the
Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. At low r the system is unstable for low values of
µ. ....................................................................................................................................... 23
Figure 2.6.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to µ, ϵ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and unstable
periodic orbits respectively. BPC’s correspond to branching point of cycles
corresponding to the intersection between stable focus and unstable periodic orbit. NS’s
represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero normal form
coefficient. NSr’s represent Neimark-Sacker giving birth to a closed invariant curve from
a fixed point. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary
eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable periodic orbits at high
values of r and low values of µ. ........................................................................................ 23
Figure 2.7.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E

xi
– F: Fixed points with respect to r. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed
points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node
with an identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf
bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a
perturbation of the neutral saddle bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. ............................... 26
Figure 2.7.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and unstable
periodic orbits respectively. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable
focus boundaries respectively. CP’s represent cusp bifurcations corresponding to a saddle
node bifurcation with zero normal form coefficient. NS’s represent neutral saddle
equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent
Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two.
GH’s represent generalized Hopf bifurcations corresponding to the intersection between
stable and unstable periodic orbit. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the
Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable
periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ. .................................................... 26
Figure 2.8.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit
and stable focus boundaries respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a
saddle node with an identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent Bogdanov-

xii
Takens correspond to a fixed point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. BP6’s
represents branching point bifurcations. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of
the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable
periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ. .................................................... 28
Figure 2.9.1: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive number
respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to ϵ. The blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed
points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node
with an identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf
bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. LP’s represents limit point
bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical zero eigenvalue. Initial conditions are
set about a perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. ......... 29
Figure 2.9.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E
– F: Fixed points with respect to ϵ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed
points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node
with an identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf
bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a
perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. ........................... 30
Figure 2.9.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E

xiii
– F: Fixed points with respect to r, ϵ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit
and stable focus boundaries respectively. DH’s represent Double Hopf bifurcations
corresponding to two distinct pairs of purely imaginary eigenvalues. GH’s represent
Generalized Hopf bifurcations corresponding to the transition between stable and
unstable periodic orbit. BT’s represent Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed point
with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation
of the Double Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable
periodic orbits for a narrow region of high r..................................................................... 30

xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BP: Branching Point Bifurcation
BT: Bogdanov-Takens
CDC: Center for Disease Control
CP: Cusp
DFE: Disease Free Equilibrium
DH: Double Hopf Bifurcation
GH: Generalized Hopf Bifurcation
H: Andronov Hopf Bifurcation
LP: Limit Point
LSA: Local Sensitivity Analyses
NS: Neutral Saddle Equilibrium
NSr’s: Neimark-Sacker
R0: Basic Reproductive Number
Re: Effective Reproductive Number
SEIR: Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered
SIS: Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
WHO: World Health Organization

Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic

1

1 INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2, presents an unprecedented challenge to
human health, the economy, and nearly all aspects of our society. COVID-19 vaccination and
practicing of CDC guidelines is the only sustainable mitigation to prevent widespread morbidity
and mortality from the infection. Vaccine hesitancy, a strong unwillingness to adopt the
vaccination independent of morbidity and perceived risk [24, 29], remains a barrier to the
achievement of herd immunity. It is difficult to comprehend that some of the greatest triumphs of
medical science are being eroded by the promotion corona-misinformation and corona-distrust
[26]. In February 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) started using the term infodemic
for the overabundance and spread of good and bad information about disease transmission and
public health mitigation approaches. The spread of corona-misinformation makes it difficult for
people to ascertain trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it [37]. The WHO,
the United Nations (UN) UNICEF, and other major world health organizations issued a joint
statement in September 2020 calling for member states to “manage the COVID-19 infodemic, to
promote healthy behaviors and mitigate the harm from corona-misinformation and coronadisinformation [40]. To address vaccine hesitancy and the role of infodemic in driving the
COVID-19 pandemic, we consider a novel model to understanding the dynamics of the coevolution of epidemics and infodemics with vaccination considered. An infodemic requires an
overabundance of information, communication between news outlets and readers and spreads
like an epidemic among humans through digital and physical outlets. We choose to model the
spread of information like the spread of infection, using simple non-linear reaction
approximations for the rate of information exchange. We incorporate an evolutionary game
theoretical framework to evaluate the role of risk of infection to an extended COVID-19
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infodemic model to help understand how the spread of good and bad information impact disease
transmission. Vaccine hesitancy remains a barrier to population inoculation against highly
infectious diseases such as SARS-CoV-2. As mass COVID-19 vaccination efforts underway
around the world, significant vaccine hesitancy, and resistance observed by healthcare workers
[15, 22] and ethnic minority groups continues to rise [28, 31]. Concerns about the safety of the
vaccine contribute to vaccine hesitancy. Distrust in the scientific expertise and health and
government authorities drives consumers away from traditional sources (newspapers, television,
radio, government agencies) to social media outlets [28], who are then more likely recipients of
bad information. Recent new studies have begun to classify and quantify the spread of bad
information about COVID-19 [32, 33]. A study, based on a national survey of US adults in
March and July of 2020, found that about 15% believed the pharmaceutical industry created the
coronavirus and more than 28% thought it was a bioweapon made by the Chinese government.
Those beliefs predicated a subsequent decrease in willingness to wear a mask or take a vaccine
[32]. An analysis of bad information from five countries (the United States, the UK, Ireland,
Spain, and Mexico showed that substantial portions of each population - anywhere from 15% to
37% - believed bad information about COVID-19 in April and May 2020, representing what the
authors call a “major threat to public health.” People who are more gullible to coronamisinformation are less likely to comply with public health recommendations and less likely to
become vaccinated [33]. Most studies on the spread of information focus on the contribution of
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp act as functional conduits in
the surge of bad information [2, 12, 27, 42]. These models suggest that the transmission of
corona-misinformation, is a palpable risk to society; facilitating public distrust and impeding the
CDC advised practices including mask wearing, social distancing, and quarantining following
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infection. Preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, one study used an agent-based model of a
norovirus outbreak to show that reducing bad information by 30% or making at least 30% of the
population fully resistant to sharing bad information, was effective in counteracting the negative
impacts of bad advice on the outbreak [7]. Another study, using a susceptible-infectioussusceptible (SIS) epidemic model on a scale free network incorporated media mitigated
reduction in infection and showed that the spread of good information can impede infection by
decreasing the basic reproductive number [39]. Additionally, both models considered the spread
of infection as influenced by the spread of information yet lacked the feedback of infection on
the spread of information. One more study used a susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered
(SEIR) model on a bipartite network (a physical social network for epidemics and a separate
information spread network for social influence) coupled with risk perception of infection to
information in the onset of epidemic [41]. Their results suggest that although heavy nonpharmaceutical intervention greatly reduces the epidemic spread, high socioeconomic cost
associated with these interventions will prevent their implementation [41]. None of these
previous network models included vaccination [7, 39, 41]. We propose a mathematical model
that couples epidemiology with evolutionary game theory to help understand the co-evolution of
epidemic and infodemic in the presence of vaccination. We use a stratified SIS model for viral
infection, accounting for the possibility of reinfection through the emergence of different viral
variants. We stratify the population to those with ’good’ and ’bad’ information. People with
’good’ information follow science-based advice, practice precautionary measures issued by CDC
including following guidelines on wearing mask, keeping social distance, and becoming
vaccinated when possible. People with ’bad’ information behave contrarily and propagate the
spread of disease. We model the spread of information using a similar framework as models for
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the spread of infections, people with ’good’ information are misinformed by the ’bad’ and
change their behavior accordingly. Furthermore, we consider the probability of ’good’ becoming
vaccinated, which depends upon the perception of risk of vaccination relative to infection and is
derived using an evolutionary game theoretical framework. Our co-evolution model of pandemic
and infodemic exhibits complex dynamics stable foci of high infection at high rates of bad
information spread (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3), stable periodic oscillations of infection at low
rates of good information spread (Figures: 2.9.1, 2.9.2), and mixed oscillations at high values of
risk perception (Figure 2.7.1). We find that the spread of bad information feeds the infectious
disease spread, allowing periodic outbreaks even for 90% vaccination efficacy in reducing the
infection. Although reducing the perception of risk of vaccination increases the vaccination
uptake, promotion of good information or reduction of bad information drives the system to
disease free state. Our results suggest that increasing the trust of the public, e.g., reducing the
risk perception of the vaccination, is not sufficient in the achievement of herd immunity;
additional mitigation methods that focus on the spread of information are needed to promote the
health of the population.
1.1

Background
Previous models have considered the reduction of infection that depends on media

coverage [39], the mitigation of disease in contrast to socioeconomic cost [41], and the
incorporation of relative vaccination morbidity relative to infection mortality [7]. One model
considered a degree distribution of infection and performed static analysis on the basic
reproductive number. Suppose there are S = {N1, N2, …, Nn} distinct nodes of degree Nj. The
degree distribution, Pj, can be expressed as the relative fraction of each degree node divided by
the cumulative sum:
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(1.1)

The first moment of the degree distribution, or commonly referred to as the mean degree, is
expressed as:
⟨𝑘⟩ = 𝑘𝑗 𝑃𝑗

(1.2)

In the classical SIS model, one considers the following set of two equations:
𝑑𝑆
= −𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝐼 + 𝜇𝐼
𝑑𝑡

(1.3)

𝑑𝐼
= 𝛽 ∗ 𝑆𝐼 − 𝜇𝐼
𝑑𝑡

(1.4)

Where β* is the effective transmissibility of infection and µ is the disease recovery rate. In a
heterogeneous model, the probability of running into the susceptible depends on the degree
distribution, the density function, Ꝋ, which is proportional to the fraction of infected with degree
k, Ik:
Θ=

∑(𝑘𝑃𝑘 ) 𝐼𝑘
⟨𝑘⟩ 𝑁𝑘

(1.5)

Where <k> is the mean degree (1.2), Nk = Sk + Ik, and Pk is the degree distribution (1.1).
Substitution of density function (1.5) into equations (1.1, 1.2), gives the following:
𝑑𝑆
= −𝛽Θ 𝑆𝑘 + 𝜇𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.6)

𝑑𝐼
= 𝛽𝛩 𝑆𝑘 − 𝜇𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.7)

Yi Wang considers the infectious dynamics of binge drinking: taking Sk as the susceptible
fraction with no or moderate drinking habits, Xk as the aware fraction that avoids encountering
the binge drinking fraction of population Ik. Substituting the effective probability of infection, β*
= βꝊ, one has the following:
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𝑑𝑆𝑘
= −𝛽Θ𝑆𝑘 + 𝜇𝐼𝑘 − 𝛼𝑆𝑘 𝑀 − 𝜎𝑋𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.8)

𝑑𝑋𝑘
= 𝛼𝑆𝑘 𝑀 − 𝜎𝑋𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.9)

𝑑𝐼𝑘
= 𝛽𝑆𝑘 Θ − 𝜇𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.10)

𝑑𝑀
= 𝜔Σ(𝐼𝑘 ) − 𝛾𝑀
𝑑𝑡

(1.11)

Where M is the media of awareness of infection and serves as the good information that reduces
the severity of the epidemic, µ is the recovery rate of the binge drinkers, α is the dissemination
rate of awareness among non/moderate drinkers, ω is the growth rate of media coverage, γ is the
depletion of media coverage due to ineffective measures, and σ is the transmission rate from
aware individuals to non/moderate drinkers [37]. In this manuscript, we consider the good
information to promote quarantine methods following infection.
Another model considers a bipartite network G = (V, Ei, Ec(t)) that incorporates information
exchange and disease spread concomitantly where V = {V1, V2, …, Vn} is the collection of n
individuals and Ei and Ec(t) correspond to the influence and contact layer respectively. In Ye’s
analysis, the influence layer is static and does not evolve in time. In the disease domain, each
element, i, takes on a health status of healthy at xi or infected at yi. Taking Ak = {Sk, Ik} to
consist of all individuals of with degree k, Ye chooses to model the infectious dynamics using an
SIR approach. Let R = N – S - I be the removed fraction of the population Under the assumption
of no vital dynamics, the transmission of infection can be described as:
𝑑𝑆𝑘
= −𝜆Θ𝑆𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.12)

𝑑𝐼𝑘
= 𝜆Θ𝑆𝑘 − 𝜇𝐼𝑘
𝑑𝑡

(1.13)
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(1.14)

Ye takes a unique modelling approach and considers non-linear modelling of policy decision
making, risk perception function, and associated cost of self-protective behavior. Their paper
considers the payoff function to depend on policy decision and risk perception and is formulated
using network coordination type games [41]. In this manuscript, we consider the homogeneous
model that focuses on the risk payoff which does not depend on policy decision nor degree
distribution, but on the relative risk of vaccination to infection (Section 2.3, [7]).
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RESULTS
A Mathematical Model for the Coevolution of Epidemic and Infodemic
We consider a stratified SIS model for both virus and information spread to model the co-

evolution of epidemic and infodemic. In the disease domain, the population is divided into
susceptible (S), infectious (I), and vaccinated (V). In the information domain, the population
consists of two mutually exclusive compartments: those with good information practice behavior
restrictive public health measures to reduce spread of disease; including mask wearing, social
distancing, and a likelihood of receiving vaccination. Likewise, those with bad information
contribute to the spread of infection and bad information. We model the spread of information
analogous to an infectious process requiring physical contact between good and bad fractions in
the information domain. Additionally, we make a strong assumption that those infected with
good information (IG) follow CDC guidelines and practice self-quarantine. Therefore, only the
infected people with bad information (IB) transmit the virus and drive the epidemic spread.
Throughout this manuscript, we evaluate the phenomenological role of perception of risk of
vaccination, rates of spread of good and bad information that drive the complex dynamics
between pandemic and infodemic. We find that decreasing the perception of risk of vaccination,
promoting the spread of good information, and reducing the spread of bad information promotes
the achievement of herd immunity. As illustrated in the schematic diagram (Figure 2.1.1), a
susceptible person with good information (SG) is exposed to the force of infection by IB to
become infected with good behavior (IG) or are recipients of bad information and become (SB). A
bad behaving infected person (IB) can recover from the disease and become a susceptible person
with bad behaviors SB at rate γ or be ’educated’ at rate ϵ to become IG. We assume that the
transmission of good information of those infected with bad information is proportional to the
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contact to good information. The susceptible with good information SG become vaccinated with
probability φ. Vaccinated people are temporarily immune with efficacy δ. The vaccination
compartment serves as a vaccination leakage for δ < 1.

Figure 2.1.1 Schematic representation of co-evolution of infodemic and pandemic. The
susceptible population with good information, SG, is infected with corona-misinformation and
virus at transmission probabilities: µ and χ respectively. The susceptible with bad information SB
have an increased force of infection χ < 𝜒̂ . Once a susceptible becomes infected, they recover at
rate γ. Additionally, the misinformed infectious IB become educated at rate ϵ. The probability
that a susceptible person with good information, SG, becomes vaccinated with probability φ. The
vaccination compartment acts as a leakage and become re-infected.

In the absence of vital dynamics, conservation implies: SG + SB + IG + IB + V = 1. Throughout
this manuscript, we use the following composite quantities: Bad (B = IB + SB), Good (G = IG +
SG), Infected (I = IG + IB), and Healthy (H = SG + SB + V). In the disease domain (the horizontal
directions of Figure 2.1.1), we assume that both infected populations: IG and IB, recover at rate γ,
but bad-behaving susceptible, SB, are infected at a higher rate than that for good-behaving
susceptible (χ < 𝜒̂ ). In the information domain (the vertical direction of Figure 2.1.1), we assume
SG is misinformed by those with the bad information, B, at transmission probability µ; those
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infected with bad information, IB, are educated through exposure to those with good information,
G, at transmission probability ϵ. We further assume that the probability of vaccination uptake
depends on the relative perception risk of vaccination relative to infection, r. We use game
theoretical framework to model the human decision-making on vaccination [6]. In a traditional
vaccination game, the payoff of an individual taking a vaccine is greater when the morbidity risk
is lower. In the context of COVID-19, the vaccination hesitancy is not due to vaccination
morbidity but may depend on risk perception of vaccination relative to infection [28, 31]. We use
rv and ri to denote the perceived risks of vaccination and infection, respectively, and define the
relative risk perception as r = rv/ri. The probability of vaccination φ depends on the strength of
initiative parameter, m, and payoff gained for adopting the vaccination strategy compared with
individuals who do not take the vaccination [6, 21]. The strength of initiative is a proportionality
constant that determines the speed of convergence at which those with the susceptible population
with the good information become vaccinated, which we assume to be constant (Section 2.3).
The co-evolution of pandemic and infodemic with the incorporation of vaccination are described
as:
𝑑𝑆𝐺
= 𝛾𝐼𝐺 − 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − 𝜒𝑆𝐺 𝐼𝐵 − 𝜇𝑆𝐺 (𝐼𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵 )
𝑑𝑡

(2.1.1)

𝑑𝑆𝐵
= 𝛾𝐼𝐵 + 𝜇𝑆𝐺 (𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 ) − 𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.1.2)

𝑑𝐼𝐺
= −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + 𝜖(𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺 )𝐼𝐵 + 𝜒𝑆𝐺 𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.1.3)

𝑑𝐼𝐵
= −𝛾𝐼𝐵 + 𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 𝐼𝐵 − 𝜖(𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺 )𝐼𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉 𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.1.4)

𝑑𝑉
= 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.1.5)

Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic
𝑑𝜙
= 𝑚𝜙(1 − 𝜙)(𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑟𝑉)
𝑑𝑡
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(2.1.6)

In these equations, the transmission rates of “bad” information spread, and “good” information
spread are µ and ϵ, respectively, which we refer to as corona-misinformation and education.
Although information spreads faster than virus transmission in the digital landscape [41], the rate
for a person to change their opinion upon receiving information varies greatly. Hence, in our
mean-field model, without the separation of information and physical networks, the rate of
information transmission (for µ and ϵ) can be greater or less than those for viral infection.
Without loss of generality, we assume the spread of corona-misinformation is less than infection
(µ < 𝜒̂ ), and the rate for education exceeds the intrinsic disease recovery rate (ϵ > γ) (Table
2.1.1).
Table 2.1.1 Model parameters and their baseline values. All parameters are unitless,
except for γ with unit 1/ day. Note that: γ, χ, χ ̂ and m are kept constant in the simulations
reported below.

In this set of baseline parameters, we choose γ = 0.07 to reflect the 14-day incubation period, and
𝜒̂ = 0.37 such that R0 = 2.5, consistent with the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2.
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To measure the prevalence of infection, we derive the effective reproductive number using the
next generation matrix technique [14, 15]. When no vaccine is available, φ = 0 = V. Solving for
the non-trivial fixed point in equation (2.1.4) leads to:
𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 − 𝛾 − 𝜖𝐺 = (

𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵
− 1) = 0
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺

(2.1.7)

where G = SG + IG is the fraction of the population with good information. For IB ≠ 0, IG = IB
(𝜒̂ SB + ϵG) / γ. Adding equations (2.1.3) and (2.1.4) together, we have:
𝐼𝐵 (

𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵
− 1) = 𝐼𝐵 (𝑅0 − 1) = 0
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺

(2.1.8)

Thus, the effective reproductive number only depends on the infection force generated with the
bad information IB. With non-trivial probability of vaccination uptake, φ ∈ (0, 1), we have:
𝐼𝐵 (

𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉
− 1)
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺

(2.1.9)

When the term within the parenthesis in equation (2.1.9) is negative for all time t ≥ 0, IB will
converge to 0 and the system reaches a disease-free equilibrium (DFE). Thus, we have the
effective reproductive number:
𝑅𝑒 =

𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉
𝛾 + 𝜖𝐺

(2.1.10)

Note that when V = 0 or δ = 1, Re reduces to R0 in equation (2.1.8). We observe that the
effective reproductive number inversely depends on the recovery rate: γ and the spread of good
information: ϵG. Re decreases with increasing vaccination efficacy: δ and increases with
probability of disease transmissibility between the bad at rate: 𝜒̂ . We note that the appearance of
the V term in the numerator of the effective reproductive number, Re, is a consequence of the
assumption of vaccination leakage where the vaccinated are re-infected by those with the bad
information. Unique to our model, the inclusion of high infection on SB by IB at transmission
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probability 𝜒̂ is two orders of magnitude higher than the infection generated on V by IB at rate (1
− δ) χ. For appropriate choices of the parameters, we obtain mixed oscillations and is reflected in
the separation of time scales in the numerator of Re (Figure 2.5.1).
2.2

Model Formulation
2.2.1

Model

We consider a stratified SIS framework partitioned into binary: good (SG, IG) vs. bad (SB,
IB) respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the susceptible individuals with good information,
SG, take the vaccine, V, which depends on the risk function φ.
𝑑𝑆𝐺
= 𝛾𝐼𝐺 − (𝜆̃𝑏 + 𝜆𝑏 + 𝜙)𝑆𝐺
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.1)

𝑑𝑆𝐵
= 𝛾𝐼𝐵 + 𝜆̃𝑏 𝑆𝐺 − 𝜆𝑔 𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.2)

𝑑𝐼𝐺
= −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + 𝛼𝑔 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑣
̃𝐺
𝑏
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.3)

𝑑𝐼𝐵
= −𝛾𝐼𝐺 + 𝛼̂𝑏 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑣
̃𝐺
𝑏 + (1 − 𝛿)𝛼𝑣 𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.4)

𝑑𝑉
= 𝜙𝑆𝐺 − (1 − 𝛿)𝛼𝑣 𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.5)

𝑑𝜙
= 𝑚𝜙(1 − 𝜙)(𝐼 − 𝑟𝑉)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.6)

In these equations:
𝐼 = 𝐼𝐺 + 𝐼𝐵

(2.2.7)

𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵

(2.2.8)

𝐺 = 𝑆𝐺 + 𝐼𝐺

(2.2.9)

𝛼𝑔 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔 𝛽𝑏𝑔 𝑆𝐺 = 𝜒𝑆𝐺

(2.2.10)

𝛼𝑣 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔 𝛽𝑏𝑔 𝑉 = 𝜒𝑉

(2.2.11)
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𝛼̂𝑏 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔 𝛽𝑏𝑔 𝑆𝐵 = 𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵

(2.2.12)

̃
𝑣
̃
𝑔 = 𝑐𝑏𝑔 𝛽𝑔 𝑆𝐺 = 𝜇𝑆𝐺

(2.2.13)

̃𝑔 𝐼𝐵 = 𝜖𝐼𝐵
𝑣
̃𝑏 = 𝑐𝑔 𝛽

(2.2.14)

2.2.2

Nullclines

Consider the state variable vector, x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5], and the vector function fj(x) for
each j = 1, 2, . . ., 5, then equations (2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6) can be expressed as:
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝑓1 (𝑥)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.16)

𝑑𝑥2
= 𝑓2 (𝑥)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.17)

𝑑𝑥3
= 𝑓3 (𝑥)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.18)

𝑑𝑥4
= 𝑓4 (𝑥)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.19)

𝑑𝑥5
= 𝑓5 (𝑥)
𝑑𝑡

(2.2.20)

The nullclines and phase portraits for two distinct of the state variables are obtained by setting all
equations to the right-hand side of equations (2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6) equal to zero.
Without loss of generality, let Nxi and Nxj represent the nullclines in xi and xj respectively. The
xi nullcline, Nxi, is obtained by setting dxi / dt equal to zero and solving for xj. The xj nullcline,
Nxj, is obtained by setting dxj / dt equal to zero and solving for xi. In our model, the SB vs. SG
nullclines are expressed as:
𝑁𝑆𝐵 =
𝑁𝑆𝐺

𝐼𝐵 (𝜒̂ 𝑆𝐵 − 𝛾)
𝜇(𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 )

𝛾𝐼𝐺 − 𝑆𝐺 (𝜙 ∗ + (𝜒 + 𝜇)𝐼𝐵∗ )
=
𝜇𝑆𝐺

(2.2.21)

(2.2.22)
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Substituting φ∗SG*/IB = (1 − δ) χV*, then the IB vs. SB nullclines are expressed as:
𝑁𝐼𝐵 =
𝑁𝑆𝐵 =

∗
)−
𝛾+𝜖(𝑆𝐺∗ +𝐼𝐺

𝜙∗ 𝑆∗𝐺
𝐼𝐵

(2.2.23)

̂
𝜒
𝜇𝑆𝐺∗ 𝑆𝐵

(2.2.24)

̂ 𝑆𝐵 −𝛾−𝜇𝑆𝐺∗
𝜒

The V vs. IB nullclines are expressed as:
𝜙∗ 𝑆 ∗

𝐺
𝑁𝑉 = (1−𝛿)𝜒𝑉

𝑁𝐼𝐵 =

(2.2.25)

∗
∗
)− 𝜒
̂ 𝑆𝐵
𝛾+𝜖(𝑆𝐺∗ +𝐼𝐺

(2.2.26)

(1− 𝛿)𝜒

The IB vs. IG nullclines are expressed as:
𝜇𝑆𝐺∗ (𝑆𝐵∗ + 𝐼𝐵 ) + 𝐼𝐵 [(1 − 𝛿)𝜒𝑉 ∗ − 𝜖𝑆𝐺∗ ]
𝑁𝐼𝐵 =
𝜖𝐼𝐵
𝑁𝐼𝐺 =

𝜖(𝑆𝐺∗

𝛾𝐼𝐺
+ 𝐼𝐺 + 𝜒𝑆𝐺∗ )

(2.2.27)

(2.2.28)

Where SG*, SB*, IB*, V*, φ*, and IG* = 1 – (SG* + SB* + IB* + V*) represent the fixed points
obtained numerically using PyDSTool [11].
2.2.3

Perturbation about Steady States

After obtaining the steady state values by setting equations (2.1.1 – 2.1.6) equal to zero
and solving numerically for the steady state vector x∗ using PyDSTool [11]. We obtain a
perturbed time series plot for the fixed points; we apply the following algorithm to determine the
perturbation about the time series data:
1. Obtain a steady state vector, x∗, using PyDSTool [11].
2. Generate a uniformly distributed random variable: u = [u1, u2, . . ., u5].
3. Loop through each component of the steady state vector: xj* in each j = 1, 2, . . ., 5.
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4. Set: zj = (1 + ϵ0 × σj × uj) × xj*, where zj is the jth component of perturbed steady state
vector z, σj = sgn(uj − 1/2) takes value of 1 or −1, and ϵ0 is the weight of the noise.
Throughout the simulation ϵ0 ∈ (0, 0.1).
5. Exit the loop and use z∗ for the new initial conditions.
2.2.4

Calculation of the Jacobian

The Jacobian of the system is computed by taking the first partials of equations (2.1.1 2.1.6). Without loss of generality, not considering equation (2.1.3), since conservation implies:
SG + SB + IG + IB +V = 1, gives rise to linear dependency. The (i, j)th element of the Jacobian is
the partial derivative of the ith equation with respect to the jth state variable of the state vector:
x* = [SG*, SB*, IB*, V*, φ*]. One obtains:
J11 = −γ − [φ∗ + (χ + µ)IB* + µSB*], J12 = −γ − µSG*, J13 = −γ − (χ + µ)SG*, J14 = −γ, J15 = −SG*,
J21 = µ(SB* + IB*), J22 = µSG* − 𝜒̂ IB*, J23 = µSG* + γ − 𝜒̂ SB*, J24 = 0, J25 = 0, J31 = 0, J32 = (𝜒̂ +
ϵ)IB*, J33 = 𝜒̂ SB* + (1 − δ)χV* − γ + ϵ(SB* + 2IB* + V∗ − 1), J34 = [(1 − δ)χ + ϵ]IB*, J35 = 0 J41 =
φ∗ , J42 = 0, J43 = −(1 − δ)χV∗ , J44 = −(1 − δ)χIB*, J45 = SG*, J51 = −mφ∗ (1 − φ∗), J52 = −mφ∗ (1
− φ∗), J53 = 0, J54 = −φ∗ (1 − φ∗)(1 + r), J55 = (1 − 2φ∗)[1 − (SG* + SB* + (1 + r)V∗)]
Where: Jij = ∂xi / ∂xj and: SG*, SB*, IB*, V∗, and φ∗ represent the fixed points obtained
numerically using PyDSTool [11]. A close observation of the 5th column shows that the
branching point bifurcation in Figure 2.7.1 is obtained for SG = 0, φ = 1, ∆E = 0 giving rise to an
identical zero eigenvalue, which corresponds to the unstable mixed Nash Equilibrium in the
coordination game (Section 2.3 and [20]).
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Game Theoretical Formulation of Vaccination
2.3.1

Deriving the Risk Function

The simplest formation of a vaccination game consists of two players: The vaccinated
(V) and defector (D), whom each have a finite set of choices πV and πD respectively. For
simplicity, we consider the defector (D), to take a chance to become infected (I). We consider the
following payoff matrix: π is 2 x 2 matrix whose (v, w)th entry is the payoff of the vth player in
response to the wth player. In the vaccination game, one obtains: πvv = 0, πvi = -ri I, πiv = -rv V,
and πii = 0 [6]. Where rv and ri are the risk perception associated to vaccination and infection
respectively. For simplicity, we consider payoffs with the vaccinated and infected interact with
each other (leaving the diagonal entries 0). Consider xv and xi the frequency of strategy selection
of vaccination and defection, i.e., infection, respectively. Since our game only considers the
selection of two strategies, then xv + xi = 1, thus the replicator equations for each species follows
as:
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 𝑥𝑗 (𝜋𝑥)𝑗 − 𝑥 ′ 𝜋𝑥
𝑑𝑡

(2.3.1)

For each j = v, i. Since xv + xi = 1, then we can simplify the coupled replicator equations into:
𝑑𝑥
= 𝑥𝑣 × (1 − 𝑥𝑣) × [(𝜋𝑥)𝑣 − (𝜋𝑥)𝑖]
𝑑𝑡

(2.3.2)

Where (πx)v − (πx)i = ∆E is the marginal expectation difference between the strategies [20].
According to the Bishop-Canning’s Theorem, one can compute the marginal expectation
difference provided there exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Since our payoff matrix π in
equation 2.3.2 follows a coordination game where the greatest payoffs are located along the main
diagonal, then we can compute the pure Nash equilibrium, which are determined by the relative
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difference in the diagonal elements [18, 20, 38]. Applying the Bishop-Cannings theorem in [20,
38] to solve for the frequency of selection, observe that:
𝑥=

𝜋𝑣𝑖
𝜋𝑣𝑖 + 𝜋𝑖𝑣

(2.3.3)

Where πvi and πiv are the expected payoffs in payoff matrix π. The marginal expectation
difference follows is:
Δ𝐸 = 𝑥𝐸[𝑣] − (1 − 𝑥)𝐸[𝑖] = −𝑟𝑣 𝑉 + 𝑟𝑖 𝐼

(2.3.4)

Since scaling the payoff matrix in 2.1 does not change the behavior of the game [6, 18], then the
marginal expectation difference can be expressed as: ∆E = I − r × V = 1 + (1 + r) V − SG − SB,
where r = rv / ri is the dimensionless relative risk perception of vaccination to infection. Thus, the
replicator equation that describes the adoption of becoming vaccinated is simply:
𝑑𝑥
= 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)Δ𝐸
𝑑𝑡

(2.3.5)

And simplifies to equation 2.1.6 when substituting x = φ and multiplying by the strength of
initiative parameter m.
2.3.2

Computing the Nash Equilibrium

Since the payoff matrix in has diagonal elements identically equal to zero, then we can
compute the Nash equilibrium. Consider φv ∈ (0, 1) the non-trivial probability of vaccination
uptake. Observe that the replicator equation in equations (2.1.6, 2.3.5) exhibits the following
dynamics:
Table 2.3.1 Marginal expectation difference ∆E in equation 2.1.6 with respect to risk
perception of vaccination relative to infection, r, fraction of vaccinated V, and fraction of
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infected I. The parameter range for the incentive to vaccinate is greater at higher levels of
infection as compared to vaccination.

For any given time, t, when the vaccinated, V, is smaller than or equal to the fraction infected, I,
the sensitivity about the perception of risk has a larger range for positive incentive to vaccinate
∆E ≥ 0 when r ∈ (0, r∗) and r∗ > 1 (Table 2.3.1: column 2). This suggests that in the early stages
of the epidemic, the perception of risk is less sensitive to increasing the fraction of the population
to become infected. The value of risk, r, that drives the risk function to an unstable equilibrium in
equation 2.1.6 corresponds to the emergence of stable oscillations in the branching point
bifurcation (Figure 2.7.1). The oscillations in φ are also a reflection of the mixed unstable Nash
equilibrium in the coordination game [20]. During the later stages of the pandemic, the fraction
of infected begin to decrease as the population begins to take the vaccine. For any given time, t,
when the vaccinated exceeds the cumulative infected and the incentive to vaccinate only exists
for r ∈ (0, r∗) where r∗ < 1 (Table 2.3.1: column 3). The value of r∗ that corresponds to the
incentive to vaccinate identically equal to zero, ∆E = 0, corresponding to the emergence of limit
cycles along the branching point bifurcation (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.7.1).
2.4

Local Sensitivity Analyses
We perform local sensitivity analysis (LSA) about the baseline parameters in Table 2.1.1.

The goal of local sensitivity analysis is to evaluate the outputs of the model (QOI’s) with respect
to key parameters of interest (POI’s). The most sensitive parameters have the most potent effects
with respect to small deviations from an initial value [4]. If 𝑝̂ and 𝑞̂ are estimated parameter and
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quantities of interest respectively, and 𝑞̂ = Q (𝑝̂ ). Then, we can perturb the parameter of interest
slightly to evaluate the local sensitivity. One defines the sensitivity indices:
𝑆(𝑝, 𝑞) =

𝑝 𝜕𝑞 𝜃𝑞
×
=
𝑞 𝜕𝑝 𝜃𝑝

(2.4.1)

Where θp is the x% perturbation about the parameter of interest, p, and θq is the response to the
perturbation. Hence, θq = x% × S (p, q) will determine the percentage change of quantity of
interest when parameter of interest p changes by x%.
Table 2.4.1 Local Sensitivity Indices S (p, q) with respect to key parameters of interest
(each column). Each row are the quantities of interest observed in Figure 2.4.1. Each entry
represents a x% change of the QOI with respect to a 10% change in the POI. For instance, a
10% increase in leads to a 1.1% decrease in V* yet increases I∗ and G∗ by 0.93% and 0.89%
respectively.

2.5

Rich Dynamical Patterns for Coevolution of Pandemic and Infodemic
We observe three predominant patterns for the Co-evolution of Pandemic and Infodemic

model. One, at intermediate rate of µ = 0.10 and low values of r = 0.34, the system undergoes
displays low frequency high amplitude of vaccination stable oscillations (Figure 2.5.1 A, D, G).
Two, at exceptional low values of r = 0.09 and intermediate µ = 0.10, the system transitions to
stable focus of high infection and vaccination corresponding to co-existence in epidemic and
vaccination (Figure 2.5.1 B, E, H). Three, at low values of r = 0.374, and high values of µ =
0.24, the system displays high frequency stable oscillations of low infection (Figure 2.5.2 C, F,
I).
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Figure 2.5.1: Three simple dynamics emerge from the co-evolution model. The three
columns represent the time evolution of state variables, effective reproductive number, and phase
portraits respectively. A, D, G: The system undergoes mixed oscillations of low amplitude low
frequency of infection. B, E, H: The system exhibits stable focus of high infection and infection.
C, F, I: The system undergoes a stable periodic oscillation of low infection (here µ = 0.24).
Initial conditions about the steady states in Figures 2.7.1, 2.7.2 using the algorithm in section
2.2.3.

2.6

Infodemic Drives Pandemic: Stopping Infodemic is necessary to stop Epidemic
To evaluate the spread of bad information in COVID-19, we start along the unstable

Hopf with r = 1.635 and vary µ as a bifurcation parameter. We observe that increasing the spread
of bad information increases the infection and, not surprisingly, reduces the good information in
the population (Figure 2.6.1). We observe the system transitions into stable oscillations of low
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infection at lower values of µ, while intermediate values of µ lead to unstable mixed oscillations,
and high values of µ drive the system to stable focus of high infection (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2).
Notably, at high levels of good information and intermediate values of bad information, the
system transitions into high frequency oscillations with low peaks of infection (Figure 2.6.3).
Hence, increasing the spread of good information is a sufficient method of public health
mitigation policy for reducing the severity of pandemic. It should be noted that our model fails to
account for the existence of super spreaders of bad information, which may have strong
contribution of infection spread (Section 3, [41]).

Figure 2.6.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective
reproductive number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in
column 1. E – F: Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable
fixed points respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has
an identical zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an
identical zero normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of
purely imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the branching
point bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. At high r the system displays mixed oscillations and
decreasing µ drives the system to DFE.
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Figure 2.6.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to µ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points
respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Hopf bifurcation
using algorithm 2.2.3. At low r the system is unstable for low values of µ.

Figure 2.6.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective
reproductive number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in
column 1. E – F: Fixed points with respect to µ, ϵ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and
unstable periodic orbits respectively. BPC’s correspond to branching point of cycles
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corresponding to the intersection between stable focus and unstable periodic orbit. NS’s
represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero normal form
coefficient. NSr’s represent Neimark-Sacker giving birth to a closed invariant curve from a fixed
point. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues.
Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation using algorithm
2.2.3. The system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ.

2.7

High Risk Perception of Infection Promotes Vaccination
One example of high risk is the disproportional perception of vaccine risk and vaccine

hesitancy [28]. To determine the effect of vaccine hesitancy and resistance to long term epidemic
mitigation, we consider the uptake of vaccination: φ to depend on the relative risk of vaccination
to infection. In the context of COVID-19, r corresponds to the risk perception of infection
relative to vaccination, although previous models have considered the relative morbidity risk of
vaccination relative to infection [6]. Our interpretation of risk perception is due to the
controversy regarding rumors associated to the vaccine throughout its development [15, 30].
Mathematically, r corresponds to the dimensionless parameter that determines the probability of
vaccination uptake, which is determined using game theory (Sections: 2.2 - 2.4). Asymptotically,
the probability of vaccination, φ, converges to zero provided the incentive to vaccinate ∆E = I −
rV is positive leading to the transition into stable focus (Figures: 2.7.1, 2.7.2). When the risk, r,
is identically 0, there is always an incentive to vaccinate for any non-zero φ and non-negative I
value. Since our theoretical formulation of vaccination follows a coordination game, there exists
an unstable mixed Nash Equilibria for non-trivial φ [20] for a critical r∗ (Sections: 2.2 - 2.4). The
critical r∗ corresponds to the emergence of periodic oscillations and the constant changing of
epidemic selection strategy [20]. Furthermore, the branching point bifurcation with and identical
zero eigenvalue corresponds to value of φ = 1 concomitant with the identity: ∆E = 0 (Figure
2.7.1, Section 2.3). We identify at intermediate values of risk; stable periodic oscillations begin
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to emerge along the branching point and Hopf bifurcations (Figure 2.7.1). The branching point
indicates a point in the domain where no local neighborhood will converge to a point in the local
region drifts away towards a region corresponding to the limit cycles [16]. Our results are
consistent with survey data that suggest that intermediate values of risk perception of vaccination
may hinder the achievement of herd immunity as indicated by the emergence of stable limit
cycles and oscillations about Re = 1 (Figures: 2.5.1, 2.5.2) [9, 23, 30]. We observe that
decreasing the risk perception of vaccination relative to infection decreases infection and
increases vaccination (Figure 2.7.1). Notably, concomitant decrease in the spread of coronamisinformation along with reduction of risk perception of vaccination is sufficient to drive the
system to DFE. At low risk and high spread of bad information, the system transitions to stable
focus of high infection (Figure 2.7.2). These results may be understood from a game theoretical
perspective by analyzing the risk function (equation 2.1.6, Section 2.3). The intersection of the
stable focus boundary (in red) and limit cycle continuation (in blue) corresponds to the
emergence of the branching point bifurcation (BP), which phenomenologically separates the
stable focus of infection from the persistent low frequency stable oscillations (Figures: 2.7.1,
2.7.2). One observes that risk, r = rv/ri, is the risk perception of vaccination relative to infection,
it follows that decreasing the relative risk is equivalent to increasing the risk of infection relative
to vaccination. Thus, this implies that high risk perception of infection leads to an increase in
vaccination. In other words, when the population takes the virus seriously, there is decreased
epidemiological severity. Additionally, intermediate risk leads to high frequency infection and
supports the notion that vaccination hesitancy promotes the propagation of disease [15, 31].
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Figure 2.7.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to r. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the neutral saddle
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3.

Figure 2.7.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
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Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Solid and dotted lines represent stable and unstable periodic
orbits respectively. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable focus boundaries
respectively. CP’s represent cusp bifurcations corresponding to a saddle node bifurcation with
zero normal form coefficient. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an
identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed
point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. GH’s represent generalized Hopf bifurcations
corresponding to the intersection between stable and unstable periodic orbit. Initial conditions
are set about a perturbation of the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3. The
system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values of µ.

2.8

High Vaccination Efficacy Impedes Infection
Previous studies have suggested that willingness to vaccinate is highly coordinated with

public perception of risk associated to vaccination [9, 19, 35, 36]. That is, high risk perception of
vaccination decreases the likelihood of the population taking the vaccine and impedes the
achievement of herd immunity. Since intermediate values of risk play a significant barrier to the
achievement of herd immunity [30], we choose to evaluate the role of vaccination efficacy along
the unstable branch at the emergence of the sub-critical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation at r = 1.6353
in Figure 2.7.1. We observe that larger vaccine efficacies only reduce the severity (amplitude of
infection) and is limited in reducing the endemic state of the endemic (Figure 2.8.1). This is a
limitation of the model, which considers the emergence of breakthrough infection, i.e.,
vaccination leakage, phenomenologically corresponding to the emergence of new strands of
COVID-19 in the long run (Section 3).
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Figure 2.8.1: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to r, µ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable
focus boundaries respectively. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an
identical zero normal form coefficient. BT’s represent Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed
point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. BP6’s represents branching point bifurcations.
Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation using
algorithm 2.2.3. The system displays unstable periodic orbits at high values of r and low values
of µ.

2.9

Education Reduces Infection
Some studies suggest that the spread of misinformation precedes the infection [17], we

consider the case where people change their behavior in response to infection. For µ ∈ (0.06,
0.1), we observe mixed oscillations along the unstable branch (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3). To
observe how the promotion of good information, which corresponds to the increase in the rate at
which people change behavior in response to infection, we start from the sub-critical AndronovHopf bifurcation at µ = 0.10 and vary the rate of education ϵ. We observe that increasing the
good information decreases the amplitude of infection yet, increases the mean frequency of
infection suggesting that reducing the spread of coronoa-misinformation is necessary to reduce
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the onset of limit cycles and stop the infection (Figure 2.6.3). We observe that promoting the
education promotes the vaccination and decreases infection, which is obtained for high risk and
low risk respectively (Figures: 2.9.1, 2.9.2). Depending on the risk, intermediate education leads
to high frequency stable oscillations (Figure 2.9.1) or complex oscillations emerging from an
unstable branching point (Figure 2.9.2). The effects of the transmission of good information can
be understood by observing Figure 2.9.3; where high risk corresponds to unstable oscillations
and low risk corresponds to stable periodic oscillation. From a public health perspective,
decreasing the risk perception of the vaccination while promoting education drives the system to
disease free equilibrium (Figure 2.9.3: A, C).

Figure 2.9.1: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to ϵ. The blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely
imaginary eigenvalues. LP’s represents limit point bifurcations where the fixed point has an
identical zero eigenvalue. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3.
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Figure 2.9.2: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to ϵ. blue and red lines represent stable and unstable fixed points
respectively. BP’s represent branching point bifurcations where the fixed point has an identical
zero eigenvalue. NS’s represent neutral saddle equilibrium; a saddle node with an identical zero
normal form coefficient. H’s represent Andronov-Hopf bifurcations with a pair of purely
imaginary eigenvalues. Initial conditions are set about a perturbation of the Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3.

Figure 2.9.3: A – B: Time series evolution of the state variables and effective reproductive
number respectively. C – D: Phase portraits for the respective time series in column 1. E – F:
Fixed points with respect to r, ϵ. Blue and red curves correspond to periodic orbit and stable
focus boundaries respectively. DH’s represent Double Hopf bifurcations corresponding to two
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distinct pairs of purely imaginary eigenvalues. GH’s represent Generalized Hopf bifurcations
corresponding to the transition between stable and unstable periodic orbit. BT’s represent
Bogdanov-Takens correspond to a fixed point with zero eigenvalue with multiplicity two. Initial
conditions are set about a perturbation of the Double Hopf bifurcation using algorithm 2.2.3.
The system displays unstable periodic orbits for a narrow region of high r.

3

CONCLUSIONS
The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an unprecedented tax on the public economy and

health on nations worldwide. This global pandemic is unique as it is the first pandemic to occur
in the digital age. The overabundance of bad information related to the coronavirus and vaccine
has been recognized as a major hurdle in the combat against the pandemic, acting as a brake on
intervention strategies in reducing the spread of infection [3, 41, 42]. An increasing amount of
evidence have shown that Covid-19 vaccines not only protect against severe symptoms and
deaths due to infection, but are effective in reducing overall infection [8, 10, 34], even against
the more infectious Delta variant. One major barrier to the increase in vaccine uptake proponents
of public health mitigation is vaccine hesitancy [28, 31]. As a new wave of COVID-19 caused by
the Delta variant races across the world, mentions of some phrases prone to vaccine
misinformation in July jumped as much as five times the June rate, according to Zignal Labs,
which tracks mentions on social media, on cable television and in print and online outlets. Some
of the most prevalent falsehoods are that vaccines don’t work (up 437 percent), that they contain
microchips (up 156 percent), that people should rely on their “natural immunity” instead of
getting vaccinated (up 111 percent) and that the vaccines cause miscarriages (up 75 percent).”
New York Times reported on August 10, 2021 [1]. To combat the controversial issues regarding
COVID-19 vaccination and achievement of herd immunity, we evaluate the concomitant spread
of infection and information in the context of emergence of new strands by including a
vaccination leakage compartment. At the beginning stages of a pandemic, the infection begins to
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take off and people do not take the appropriate precautionary measures to reduce the infection.
Since the spread of corona-misinformation precedes the onset of infection, we model the disease
infection driven by those carrying bad information [17]. We choose to evaluate the role of
vaccination in reducing the spread of infection driven by those with bad information. Since
public trust and perception of vaccination significantly contribute to the likelihood of vaccination
uptake, we consider modeling the adoption of vaccination, which depends on risk perception of
vaccination relative to infection [19, 35]. Using an evolutionary game theoretical framework to
model the probability of vaccination uptake, we observe that high perception of risk leads to the
emergence of stable limit cycles corresponding to a persistent state of infection (Figures: 2.7.1,
2.7.2). Lastly, we observe that although good information reduces the severity of infection,
reduction in the spread of bad information is sufficient to inhibit the recurrence and severity of
infection (Figures: 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3). Since our model considers the spread of coronamisinformation to require physical interaction between good and bad information domains,
reducing the spread of bad information delays the recurrence of infection is obtained by limiting
the interaction between good and bad information domains and not by reducing the abundance of
information. Additionally, our model fails to discriminate between disinformation and
misinformation, the key difference focusing on the malicious intent of the latter.
Furthermore, we note that our model considers the spread of information which requires physical
contact between good and bad domain carriers and is independent of the quantity of information
exchange [41]. We consider the probability of vaccination uptake, which is derived using
classical evolutionary game theory replicator equations [20]. Lastly, we consider an SIS model
with temporary immunity of vaccination due to the potential for the emergence of new COVID19 variants, which act as a brake on the achievement of herd immunity and supports the
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recurrence of future infection [5]. We note that other frameworks that model the impact of
information on infection consider SEIR type disease domain models [39, 41]. Since the
vaccination compartment has a leakage and the vaccinated become re-infected, then the
achievement of herd immunity cannot be obtained by increasing the fraction of the population to
become vaccinated. Hence, vaccination only acts as a temporal delay on the infection spread
rather than decrease on long term epidemiological severity. This differs from mathematical
models that considers vaccinated individuals to return to the susceptible compartment [6].
3.1

Future Directions
Alternative approaches to our model may consider using a SEIR with a vaccination

compartment focused on a specific strand or an SIR model in the disease domain. Our model is
catered to the potential emergence of new strands of COVID-19 in the long run. We may also
alter the risk function to include information in the payoff calculation Our results suggest that
even at vaccination efficacy as high as 90%, reducing the spread of bad information is necessary
to stop the spread of infection; supporting public health mitigation strategies that focus on
information exchange. Additionally, our model is limited in a compartmental framework, which
assumes equal probability of transmission throughout the population. The compartmental model
is not the most representative spread of information, since most digital and social networks admit
super spreaders with higher levels of spread. Our model may be extrapolated onto a bipartite
network in which the information domain takes the form of a social network, and the disease
domain takes the form of scale free network. Alternatively, one may consider modeling the
transmission between stratified aged populations in the disease domain. It would be interesting to
see how the results depend on the connectivity of the hubs. Like Ye’s framework, one may
consider the bipartite network in lieu of the stratified SIS model [41]. Although the results of the
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co-evolution of pandemic and infodemic are limited to the context of emerging strands of
COVID-19, the modelling of information exchange may be extrapolated to the exchanging of
ideas. The exchanging of ideas requires close communication between sender and receiver and
this interaction may be assumed to be non-linear since the absence of sender or receiver may lead
to a lack of idea exchange. As thoughts, which are often driven by information received and
interpreted, and actions are driven by initiative. The stable oscillations in the co-evolution model
may be interpreted as robust interplay between thoughts and actions.
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